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Flight from the Center:
Is It Just or Just About Money?
Burnele V. Powellt
The central concern of the American legal profession dur-
ing the first decade of the twenty-first century will be the com-
pletion of its transition from a cartel based on the punishment,
or threat of punishment, of transgressors into a profession
guided by ideals that are embraced as defining characteristics.1
At its core, this evolution is about the nature of lawyer respon-
sibility to clients and the courts. To identify this issue is also to
acknowledge that the lawyer-client relationship has not always
been pure in its motives or perfect in its execution.2 Too often,
too little attention has been given to the lawyer's professional
question-How can I do good?-and too much attention to the
lawyer's business question-How can I do well?
Whether, and to what effect, the transition from trade as-
sociation to professional association will be completed is not at
all certain. During the final three decades of the twentieth cen-
tury, the drive toward professionalism has certainly acceler-
ated, bringing the American legal profession to a point even
more accomplished than its fabled golden era.3 Still, because
changes in the legal profession, including reforms of its sub-
stantive rules,4 its regulatory procedures, 5 and its sanctioning
t Dean and Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City School
of Law. B.A. 1970, University of Missouri at Kansas City; J.D. 1973, Univer-
sity of Wisconsin; LL.M. 1979, Harvard University.
1. See Burnele V. Powell, Open Doors, Open Arms, and Substantially
Open Records: Consumerism Takes Hold in the Legal Profession, 28 VAL. U. L.
REV. 709, 740-41 (1994).
2. See generally David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 GEO. L.J. 957
(1999); Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 283 (1998).
3. See Burnele V. Powell, Diagnosis and Prescription: Illusory Lawyer
Disciplinary Reform and the Need for a Moratorium, 1 J. INST. FOR STUDY
LEGAL ETHICS 263, 284 n.11 (1996); see also infra note 59.
4. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983). In
1997, the ABA initiated a new look at the substantive rules, naming the ABA
Commission on the Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Ethics
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standards,6 have coincided with the most dizzying and complex
socio-economic and psychological changes in our nation's his-
tory,7 our ability to appreciate the extent of the advance has
been severely tested. Whatever may be the perception of those
changes today, however, the lesson over time will be that we
have vastly underestimated the depth and breadth of the
change that has occurred in the legal profession.
Although replacement of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
marks the beginning of the modern, reality-based 8 view of the
legal profession, the profession has since taken on a string of
tough issues that bolster its claim to being the strongest, most
substantively attentive, and most active professional regulatory
regime in the nation.9 The American Bar Association's (ABA)
adoption of the McKay recommendations, which moved lawyer
disciplinary systems conceptually from punishment-based,
lawyer-discipline regimes to assistance-based, lawyer-
regulatory systems, illustrates the quiet change.' 0 Thus, de-
2000). See generally COMMISSION ON THE EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, available at <http'//www.
abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k.html>.
5. In 1989, the ABA established the Commission on Evaluation of Disci-
plinary Enforcement (the McKay Commission). See Powell, supra note 1, at
709 n.2.
6. In 1986, the ABA House of Delegates adopted the ABA Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. The Standards were amended in 1992. See Cen-
ter for Professional Responsibility: Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
(visited Mar. 28, 2000) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/pubs/561-0104.html>.
7. See Thomas R. Tinder, The Tinder Box: Interesting Ti[dibits, W. VA.
LAW., Nov. 1998, at 35; James R. Wetzel, American Families: 75 Years of
Change, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 1990, at 4.
8. "Reality-based" views encompass such pragmatic decisions as the
more lenient treatment of rules allowing fee splitting and the use of threats of
litigation.
9. The McKay Report called for such needs as expanding regulation to
protect the public and to assist lawyers, strengthening regulation of the pro-
fession by the judiciary, increasing public confidence in the disciplinary sys-
tem, expediting the disciplinary process, and providing adequate resources to
support the operation of disciplinary systems. See COMMISSION ON
EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, REPORT
ix-xvii (1991) [hereinafter MCKAY REPORT].
10. In reference to the McKay recommendations, note that:
Although never explicitly acknowledged, the McKay Report departed
from the Clark Report in fundamentally different ways in regard to
focus, philosophy, and programs.... McKay's recommendations re-
flected the need for the profession, as it were, to invite the public in-
side the lawyer disciplinary process, to embrace the legal profession's
critics so that they might feel vested in the lawyer regulatory system,
1440
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spite the failure of many lawyers to notice the change, the
regulatory model, with its emphasis on helping the public by
helping errant lawyers, now sets the cadence for the profes-
sion." Despite the slow and, at times, arduous pace of
change,'2 however, at the close of the twentieth century there is
little room for doubt that the legal profession has demonstrated
that it can, indeed, do well while simultaneously acting in its
highest tradition as servant of the courts and the public. 13
and to lower the barriers of professionalism that have historically left
lawyers, vulnerable to charges that they care more about themselves
than about their clients or the general society.
Powell, supra note 1, at 723. See, e.g., MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT Rule 11(G) (1996) (discussing the Alternatives to
Discipline Program which can include "arbitration, mediation, law office man-
agement assistance, lawyer assistance programs, psychological counseling,
continuing legal education programs, and ethics school").
11. It should not be surprising that most lawyers pay little attention to
the lawyer regulatory system. Since most are unlikely ever to have contact
with it beyond registration and fee payments. It remains, like the brake pads
on an automobile, something whose dependability is assumed unless there is
screeching or an outright system failure.
12. For example, note the battle to open the records under the Oregon
Rule. See Powell, supra note 1, at 717 ("McKay urged the profession to im-
prove the credibility of the lawyer discipline process by opening complaint files
and providing complainants with case-status reports covering the disciplinary
process from complaint through disposition."). Unfortunately, the Commis-
sion's endorsement of this so-called Oregon Rule sought, imprudently in the
eyes of many, "to link the open records recommendation with the recommen-
dation elsewhere that complainants have absolute immunity from civil or
criminal liability." Id. at 718. Furthermore, note the "landslide" victory for
rewriting Model Rule 6.1, see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
6.1 (1993); the continuing fight over the "noisy withdrawal" and client fraud
exception, see Center for Professional Responsibility: Model Rule 1.6-Re-
porter's Explanation of Changes, Ethics 2000 Commission Draft for Public
Comment, March 1999 (visited Mar. 28, 2000) <http'//www.abanet.org/
cpr/e2klrulel6memo.html>; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW:
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 117B (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, Apr. 1998); and
downright silly decisions such as Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S.
618, 635-45 (1995) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's reliance on
a non-scientific, self-serving report generated by the Florida Bar as the basis
for allowing Florida Bar rules banning truthful advertising). In Florida Bar v.
Went For It, Inc., the Court accepted the report's conclusion that Floridians
considered targeted direct-mail solicitations of accident victims within 30 days
of an accident to be an invasion of privacy and therefore detrimental to the
public perception of attorneys. Thus, in holding the Florida Bar rule as consti-
tutional, the Court accepted the view that an unsubstantiated expression of
public perception about an influential interest group justified limiting com-
mercial speech implicating an individual's right to timely, truthful, under-
standable information likely to aid their decision-making and advance their
economic interest. See id.; see also Powell, supra note 3, at 263-65.
13. For example, Model Rule 6.1 encourages lawyers to provide fifty hours
144120001
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Notwithstanding what has been achieved, however, that
which is, perhaps, the most daunting challenge still lies ahead.
Having put in place changes that will inevitably transform the
practice of law, the legal profession must now face squarely an
issue that, up to this point, it has been able to deflect or artfully
sidestep. With publication of the ABA Commission on Multi-
disciplinary Practice's Report, the question uncomfortably
raised is whether, having addressed its ethics14 and ethos,15 the
profession is now prepared to address the public impact of its
economic structure. 16 It must decide whether rules that define
how legal services are delivered are intended to serve the needs
of pro bono service per year, see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 6.1 (1993), while Rule 8.2 requires the attorney to communicate with
candor to a tribunal or to the public when seeking public office, see id. Rule
8.2.
14. See supra note 3. Over the course of a decade, the ABA rewrote its
model ethics rules for both lawyers and judges. On August 2, 1983, it replaced
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Canons of Ethics) with the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Previously it had adopted the ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct.
15. The legal profession's focus on "professionalism" during the last dec-
ade has been nothing, if not a testament, to hope and perseverance. We per-
sist in attempts to make this ideal concrete, despite continuing strong evi-
dence that confusion reigns, at least in part, because we lack an agreed
definition of professionalism. We are unable to measure the significance of its
presence or absence and even if we understood it, no common course of action
exists about how we might address it. See, e.g., Burnele V. Powell, Lawyer
Professionalism as Ordinary Morality, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 275, 277 (1994) (ob-
serving that "the pursuit of lawyer professionalism has generated such pas-
sionate support... and such a variety of self-proclaimed innovative programs,
codes and experiments, that one has to wonder how a concept that is so widely
discussed could be so little-defined"); Timothy P. Terrell & James H. Wildman,
Rethinking "Professionalism," 41 EMORY L.J. 403, 404 (noting that "the con-
cept of professionalism has become confused and disjointed"); see also Deborah
L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665, 668-69
(1994) (noting that the steps that might be appropriate to ensure that all in-
terests are effectively represented, so as to mitigate the problem of unequal
advocacy, have never been satisfactorily elaborated); Kara Anne Nagorney,
Note, A Noble Profession? A Discussion of Civility Among Lawyers, 12 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 815, 815-16 (1999). Nagorney noted that:
As incivility has become recognized as a legitimate concern, we are
now faced with the decision on how to address it. That is, to more
precisely consider what it is, where it is manifest, what it has done to
change the nature and perception of the profession, possibilities for
improvement, and what benefits improvements will bring.
Id.
16. More than a few have sought to characterize the MDP discussion as
solely about economics. See, e.g., Richard E. Mikels & Mark I. Davies, Multi-
disciplinary Practices: Ethical Concerns or Economic Concerns, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., July-Aug. 1999, at 20.
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of the courts, clients and the public-which is to say, to pro-
mote the doing of good-or the economic interest of lawyers in
exploiting a professional monopoly' 7-which is to say, to ensure
that lawyers do well.
At the outset, it must be conceded that the line distin-
guishing when the legal profession is seeking to do good for the
public as opposed to simply doing well for itself is not easily
drawn. In many, if not most, instances, the result consists of a
combination of outcomes. 18 Still, in the instant case, the ac-
knowledgement that the fight over whether legal services
should be permitted through structures other than the tradi-
tional law firm has been remarkable for its candor about the
raw economic interests at stake. 9 Opponents, 20 proponents,2'
17. There is no suggestion here that lawyers have anything more than a
figurative monopoly. As the McKay Report makes clear, it is the highest court
in each jurisdiction that has the monopoly: lawyers are only privileged to serve
the court under a licensing system that requires proof of minimum compe-
tency. See MCKAY REPORT, supra note 9, at iii-v, ix, 2-7.
18. Consider, for example, the rejection of the Model Code's DR 2-107(A),
prohibiting fee splitting except when the client consents and each lawyer does
equal work, in favor of Model Rule 1.5(e), allowing fee splitting with the cli-
ent's consent and each lawyer assumes "joint responsibility." MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e) (1983). The change was said to do
good for clients by encouraging lawyers to affiliate with lawyers who could
bring a higher degree of expertise to a case. Of course, lawyers coincidentally
were able to do well for themselves, since the change better facilitated "bun-
dling" of cases. A profit, therefore, could be made on the attraction and refer-
ral of a case, even when no substantive legal value was added to a client's
case.
19. The very first witness from whom the Commission heard at the 1999
ABA Annual Meeting, Pam H. Schneider, outgoing Chair of the ABA Section
of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law-the largest of the ABA Sections-
testified that in the areas of real property and trust law there have been
significant inroads by nonlawyers in the practice of law. See Hearings Before
the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Aug. 8, 1999) (testimony of
Pam H. Schneider, outgoing Chair of the ABA Section of Real Property,
Probate and Trust Law), available at <http'//www.abanet.org/cpr/
schneider.html> [hereinaier Schneider Testimony].
Schneider went on to report that the Section Council supported the Com-
mission's recommendations as an essential starting point for modifying the
Model Rules to permit multidisciplinary practices. See id. It urged, however,
that further consideration, consultation, and deliberation of the specific struc-
ture be undertaken prior to implementation to assure that the values of the
legal profession-including the preservation of independent professional
judgment, client loyalty, and confidentiality-not be compromised. See id.
20. The written testimony filed with the Commission for its August 8,
1999 hearing by Steven C. Krane framed the issue this way:
Why are we looking at this issue at all? Why has MDP suddenly been
thrust upon the legal profession as an issue with which it must grap-
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and observers22 alike have acknowledged the economic ramifi-
cations of the multidisciplinary practice (MDP) debate.
Speaking unreservedly in the lead-off debate on the issue be-
fore the ABA House of Delegates, Mr. Lawrence Fox 23 made the
hall ring with an allusion to Senator Dale Bumpers' remarks
before the Senate's recent Trial of Impeachment: "When you
hear somebody say, 'This is not about money,' it's about
money."24 If the economic implications of the carving up of the
ple? Is there any validity to the mantra of providing clients with the
opportunity for "one-stop shopping," to which we repeatedly hear
MIDP proponents refer as the principal justification for permitting
lawyers to form professional partnerships with nonlawyers. The
mantra, which assumes certain efficiencies arising out of integration
of efforts on behalf of clients, is incanted chiefly by accounting firms
and traditionally anti-lawyer organizations. It is incanted by a self-
selected sampling of organizations which purport to represent the in-
terests of consumers of legal services and insist that there is client
demand for MDPs. At bottom, the reason the legal profession feels it-
self pressed to deal with the MDP issue at all is because the issue is
being forced upon the profession mainly by nonlawyers who would
like to add legal services as an additional profit center for their or-
ganizations, and by lawyers who see MDP as a means of enhancing
their bottom line.
Hearings Before the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Aug. 8, 1999)
(testimony of Steven C. Krane, partner, Proskauer Rose, L.L.P. and member of
the Executive Committee of the New York State Bar Association), available at
<http'//www.abanet.org/cpr/krane.html> [hereinafter Krane Testimony].
21. See Schneider Testimony, supra note 19 (stressing that the Section
Council believed that the marketplace required a comprehensive framework
that would allow the legal profession to regulate the competition).
22. Delos Lutton, in written testimony for the Paris-headquartered Union
Internationale des Avocats (UIA), which he described as "the world's oldest in-
ternational association of bars, bar associations, and law societies," advised:
We [the UIAI took no position on whether MDPs should be permitted,
because, as an international association, we had to face the reality
that MDPs are in fact permitted and exist in many countries.... [We
only want to emphasize that our proposal does not encourage anyone
to adopt MDPs. Instead, it recognizes that they exist and imposes
standards to be met in order to preserve the crucial aspects of the at-
torney-client relationship which have been an integral part of the jus-
tice system in advanced societies for many hundreds of years: confi-
dentiality, independence, loyalty, and avoidance of conflicts of
interest.
Hearings Before the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Aug. 8, 1999)
(testimony of Delos N. Lutton, U.S. National Vice President, Union Interna-
tionale des Avocats), available at <http'//www.abanet.org/cpr/lutton.html>.
23. Lawrence J. Fox, former chair of the ABA Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, has been a leading critic of the Com-
mission's recommendations. See John Gib~aut, Practice Debate Heats Up:
State Bar Leaders Say Multidisciplinary Plan Needs Study, A.B.A. J., Aug.
1999, at 14, 15.
24. Transcript: Former Senator Dale Bumpers (posted Jan. 21, 1999)
1444 [Vol. 84:1439
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nation's legal business were not readily apparent, the Commis-
sion was reminded of what was at stake by a variety of wit-
nesses: U.S. tax lawyers worrying about the increasing
empowerment 25 and professional competitiveness 26 of domestic
and foreign accounting firms;27 large law firms decrying and
<http'//www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/01/21/transcripts/bumpers.
html> (quoting H.L. Mencken). Larry Fox's invocation of Senator Bumpers'
remarks during the argument supporting tabling the Commission's Report set
the tone of the debate. Bumpers had said:
It was a breach of his family trust.] It is a sex scandal. H.L. Men-
cken said one time, "When you hear somebody say, 'This is not about
money,' it's about money ... And when you hear somebody say, This
is not about sex,' it's about sex."
Id.
In his recounting of his nightmare in which all law firms had been taken
over by large accounting firms, Fox's reminder in essence was that, "They say
that it ain't about money, but of course, it's about money." Cf. Hearings Before
the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 4, 1999) (written remarks
of Lawrence J. Fox, Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP), available at <http:I/www.
abanet.org/cpr/foxl.html>; Hearings Before the Commission on Multidisci-
plinary Practice (Feb. 4, 1999) (oral testimony of Lawrence J. Fox, Drinker
Biddle & Reath LLP), available at <http//www.abanet.orgcpr/fox3.html>.
25. Section 3411(a) of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Re-
form Act of 1998 added § 7525 to the Internal Revenue Code, extending attor-
ney-client confidentiality to CPAs for tax advice not involving criminal tax
matters. Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3411, 112 Stat. 206, 750 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 7525).
26. The Commission was told about the rising numbers of tax lawyers in
the ABA Section on Taxation now affiliated with accounting firms. Also noted
were the increasingly high numbers of top law school graduates annually re-
cruited by accounting firms.
27. Because the United States and Canada are the lucrative markets for
lawyer services, the accounting profession is prepared to work for as long as
may be necessary to gain entry into it. In written remarks, Melinda Merk and
Patrick Schmidt, co-chair and vice chair of the Tax Law Committee of the
Young Lawyers Division of the American Bar Association offered the following
assessment in testimony before the Commission:
During the last few years, the legal profession has undergone signifi-
cant changes, particularly in the tax law area. Today, young lawyers
have more opportunities upon graduation from law school to apply
their legal education in non-traditional practice settings such as con-
sulting firms, banks, and trust companies, investment and financial
planning services firms, corporate legal departments, and various
governments agencies. The marketplace has changed in the last few
years as well-young entrepreneurs of the ".com generation" are
looking for efficient "one-stop shopping," where all of their business,
financial, legal, and investment needs can be taken care of by a team
of advisors under one roof. Given the current state of affairs, one
wonders who the existing Model Rules are really protecting?
Hearings Before the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Mar. 3, 2000)
(written remarks of Melinda Merk and Patrick Schmidt, co-chair and vice
chair of the Tax Law Committee of the Young Lawyers Division of the Ameri-
2000] 1445
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warning against the missteps of the ancillary business prac-
tices debate;28 lawyers in boutique law firms asking for recogni-
tion that the future of legal practice has already turned to-
wards specialized forms of practice that are interdisciplinary
and collaborative;29 and the urgings by general practitioners
can Bar Association), available at <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/yld.html> (em-
phasis in original).
28. Alone among the jurisdictions, on March 1, 1990 (effective January 1,
1991), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals adopted a version of ABA
Model Rule 5.4(b) permitting fee sharing between a lawyer and a nonlawyer.
What at first appeared to be a major departure from the common view, how-
ever, has proven to be of less than apparent value. As adopted, the D.C. ver-
sion of 5.4(b) restricted such partnerships solely to organizations providing le-
gal services. This limitation proved to be the provision's undoing. It had the
practical effect of allowing nonlawyers to join law firms, while preventing law-
yers from becoming partners in the firms of other professionals. See generally
Susan Gilbert & Larry Lempert, The Nonlawyer Partner: Moderate Proposals
Deserve a Chance, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 383 (1988). See COMMISSION ON
MuLTIDIscIPLINARY PRAcTIcE, AMERICAN BAR ASSN, REPORTER'S NOTES
(1999), available at <http'//www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpappendixc.html> [herein-
after REPORTERS NOTES] (citing additional limitations imposed as a result of
ABA Formal Opinion 91-360, holding it impermissible for law firms operating
in more than one jurisdiction to have a nonlawyer partner in its D.C. office).
29. The effort to restrict multijurisdictional practice runs entirely counter
to the entire edifice on which the late twentieth century American-and
global-economic expansion has been built, namely free trade. See Anthony E.
Davis, Collision Course with Disaster-Changes in "MDP,' "MJP," and "UPL,"
N.Y. L.J., Mar. 6, 1990, at 3.
The Statement on Multidisciplinary Practice in the ABA Section of Envi-
ronment, Energy and Resources noted that:
1. The practice areas represented by the Section of Environment, En-
ergy and Resources have very long experience with multidisciplinary
practice....
2.... However, long experience of Section members shows that for
environmental, energy, and resource practitioners many of the feared
problems of multidisciplinary practice are more theoretical than real.
After extensive inquiries we have identified very few examples where
malpractice, conflicts of interest, or unauthorized practice of law ac-
tually resulted from the participation of professionals from other dis-
ciplines in legal work in these practice fields, although there are a
number of instances where clients were led astray by regulatory
analysis conducted by non-lawyers.
3. The factors that have led to multidisciplinary practice in our fields
are, if anything, accelerating- the complexity of regulatory programs;
the interconnectedness of technological, economic, and legal issues;
the globalization of both activities and impacts; the explosive growth
of available data; and the interest of lawyers who have (voluntarily or
by necessity) left law practice, but who wish to continue to use their
special skills.
4. Any high walls that we try to create to insulate lawyers' work from
that of other professionals will likely be swamped by events, and will
be disservice to our members and our clients.
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that the rules must be adjusted to allow small and solo practi-
tioners the options necessary to compete with business com-
petitors who are increasingly engaged in the delivery of low-end
legal services.30
Preliminarily, at least, it is the Commission itself that
must wrestle with the issue of whether its Report found the
appropriate balance in the debate over MDP.31 Although it
made clear in its initial presentation to the ABA House of Dele-
gates that the Commission's intent was to address only the
ethical and structural concerns inherent in allowing lawyers to
join with other professionals to offer services through a single
practice32 (which is to say, the requirements for doing good), the
6. The Section, in particular, and the American Bar Association, in
general, can play a constructive role by undertaking the following ef-
forts:
(d.) Foster understanding among the professions by encouraging
multidisciplinary conferences, training programs, and profes-
sional societies;
(e.) Help our members who are not employed in traditional law-
yer settings to maintain their legal proficiency, share thoughts
and experiences with other lawyers, and have access to legal re-
search resources; and
(f.) Clarify and make more rational the restrictions on non-
lawyers joining law firms and on lawyers joining non-law firms.
Section of Environment, Energy and Resources, American Bar Ass'n, State-
ment on Multidisciplinary Practice (visited Apr. 24, 2000) <http://www.abanet.
org/environlpractice.html>.
30. Noted, in particular, were real estate brokers, insurance sales person-
nel, financial planners, social workers, and even the publishing industry. In
an earlier ABA Commission, the Commission on Nonlawyer Activity in Law
Related Situations, one witness before that Commission reportedly estimated
that in less than a decade, 50,000 independent legal technicians would be pro-
viding legal services in numerous instances: divorces, child support enforce-
ment, low asset personal bankruptcy, estate probates, social security applica-
tions, name changes, visas, extensions of stay and other immigration matters,
applications for credit and eviction complaints and defense. See COMMISSION
ON NONLAWYER PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR ASs'N, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY IN
LAW-RELATED SITUATIONS 10 (1995); see also REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note
28 (citing Elizabeth McDonald, Texas Probes Andersen, Deloitte On Charges of
Practicing Law, WALL ST. J., May 28, 1998, at B15).
31. See COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR
ASS'N, REPORT (1999), available at <http//www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpreport.
html> [hereinafter REPORT].
32. ABA Model Rule 5.4 provides, in pertinent part, that:
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlaw-
yer, except that:
(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or
associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable
20001 1447
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resolution to table the Report adopted by the House of Dele-
gates was pointedly aimed at sending a message that some
sizeable number of delegates were primarily concerned about
what such a change would mean for their economic well-being,
notwithstanding the needs of the courts or the public.3 3 In view
of the tabling, therefore, the obligation is now clearly on the
Commission to decide whether it matters, and if so how much,
that the good it has sought to accomplish may have the conse-
quence of leaving some lawyers less well-off financially or so-
cially.34
period of time after the lawyer's death; ...
(2) a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled,
or disappeared lawyer[;] ... and
(3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a
compensation or retirement plan...
(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any
of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs,
or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or
regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal
services.
(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a profes-
sional corporation or association authorized to practice law for a
profit, if:
(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest[;] ...
(2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or
(3) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the profes-
sional judgment of a lawyer.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (1983).
33. It is, of course, impossible to say what percentage of the proponents
for Report No. 109 were focused solely on economic concerns, some combina-
tion of economic and ethical concerns, or entirely on ethical concerns. See gen-
erally AMERICAN BAR ASSN, REPORT ON THE ANNUAL MEETING (1999), avail-
able at <http'//abanet.org/scripts/leadership/select.html>; Robert R. Keating,
ABA Delegates Report: Report of the Actions at the 1999 Annual Meeting,
COLO. LAW., Oct. 1999, available at <http//cobar.org/tc/1999/october/
ABAdelegate.htm>. That is the nature of legislative logrolling. Still, the
heavy emphasis laid on the economic implications of allowing multidisciplin-
ary practice makes it clear that the majority was not indifferent to the consid-
eration.
34. The concern here is not simply that lawyers might be less well off in
terms of the financial bottom line, although that is surely the largest concern.
Important, too, are the concerns of self-image and professional standing en-
gendered by the Commission Report. The lawyer who foresees himself in
"competition" with a nonlawyer for the right to represent a client can under-
standably view the eventuality as evidence of lost social standing. It is clearer
still that social standing has been lost when a lawyer looks into the future and
foresees that she is working under the supervision of someone who lacks for-
mal legal training.
1448 [Vol. 84:1439
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Accordingly, in the succeeding sections, this Article ad-
dresses three questions that are preliminary to resolving the
ultimate issue raised here: Should the Commission abandon
the center position represented by the Report because of the fi-
nancial and social concerns that it has raised? To this end,
Part I briefly summarizes what the Commission Report con-
cluded. Part II states and responds to the key critiques of the
Commission Report. Finally, Part III addresses directly the
question of the proper role of economic and social considera-
tions in the exercise of the lawyer regulatory process. I con-
clude that when protecting clients and judicial processes, the
rational approach to lawyer regulation must seek to balance
the judicial need for rules that are clear and easily applied,
while giving consideration to the procedures, practices and tra-
ditions of the legal profession. Such an analysis, also, must not
give determinative weight to the financial and social concerns
of lawyers at the expense of clients and the profession.
I. WHAT DID THE COMMISSION REPORT CONCLUDE?
"[Tihere is an interest, by clients," the Commission con-
cluded, "in the option to select and use lawyers who deliver le-
gal services as part of a multidisciplinary practice."35 Many
would agree that those words have forever changed the Ameri-
can legal profession. No matter the ultimate disposition of the
Commission's recommendations,36 that declaration-unani-
mously adopted by the Commission of twelve expert commis-
35. REPORT, supra note 31.
36. The Commission was under the leadership of Sherwin P. Simmons,
Steel, Hector & Davis, LLP, Miami, Florida. See id. Other members included:
the Honorable Carl 0. Bradford, Maine Superior Court, Portland, Maine; the
Honorable Paul L. Friedman, United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, Washington, D.C.; Professor Phoebe A. Haddon, Temple University
School of Law, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr.,
University of Pennsylvania School of Law, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania;
Roberta Reiff Katz, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Netscape
Communications Corp., Mountain View, California; Carolyn B. Lamm, White
& Case, Washington, D.C.; Robert H. Mundheim, Salomon Smith Barney
Holdings, Inc., New York, New York; Steven C. Nelson, Dorsey & Whitney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota; Dean Burnele V. Powell, University of Missouri-
Kansas City School of Law, Kansas City, Missouri; Michael Traynor, Cooley
Gedward, L.L.P., San Francisco, California; and Herbert S. Wander, Katten
Muchen & Zavis, Chicago, Illinois. See CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION ON
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE (1999), available at <http'/www.abanet.
org/cpr/multicommember.html>. Professor Mary C. Daly, Fordham University
School of Law, New York, New York, served as the Commission's Reporter.
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sioners and two liaisons from the ABA Board of Governors 37-
publicly acknowledged three truths that for long had only been
whispered about within the legal community.
First, the declaration acknowledged that the Commission's
decision turned mostly on a determination of "an interest by
clients," rather than on the interests of practicing lawyers. Al-
though discussions within the Commission recognized the im-
portant interests represented by others (e.g., judges and law-
yers), it was equally clear, as was finally recommended, that
the Commission viewed its responsibilities as, first and fore-
most, owed to the public.
Second, the Commission spoke about "interest by clients in
the option [of MDP]."38 Thus, the Commission readily acknowl-
edged the limits of its ability to prognosticate. What was im-
portant was that clients have an alternative to the existing
course of securing lawyer services only through the traditional
law firm or in-house counsel arrangement.39 There was, how-
ever, no claim that clients were clamoring to jettison their cur-
rent modes of securing legal services. The Commission merely
determined that in this context the fiducial obligation of the le-
gal profession requires recognition that concerns about how
services are rendered are most appropriately within the client's
province.
Finally, the Commission was clear in noting its determina-
tion that those who deliver legal services as part of a multidis-
ciplinary practice would be expected to do so consistent with
the general standards governing lawyers in the traditional set-
tings. In other words, the recommendation that a multidisci-
plinary practice be recognized did not entail the creation of a
different standard of practice, but rather a different corporate
structure for the delivery of quite familiar services. As was the
case when the legal profession's structure evolved from the solo
37. Joanne M. Garvey, Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe, San Fran-
cisco, California and Seth Rosner, of counsel Jacobs Persinger & Parker, New
York, New York, served as Board of Governors Liaisons. See REPORT, supra
note 31. As such, they exercised all of the privileges of Commission members,
but they were not technically members. Each, however, played a prominent
role in the Commission's determination.
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. The Commission did not urge that in-house counsel be allowed to ren-
der legal services to the public. Instead, it focused on elevating the expertise
available to the corporate client. See id. Silence on the matter did not rule
out, however, that what was previously an in-house counsel operation might
not transform itself into a multidisciplinary practice.
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practitioner to the small firm, and then again to embrace the
large law firm, the government law office, in-house counsel,
and most recently the ancillary business law firm, the Commis-
sion saw structural change not only as beneficial, but as inevi-
table because it was beneficial. Mindful, too, of the ways in
which the corporate structure of the law firm has been influ-
enced, if not driven, by the economic imperatives of the prac-
tice, the Commission took note of the changes that have al-
ready occurred in response to lawyers' needs for
multidisciplinary support, including law firms using affilia-
tions, contractual arrangements, relocations to sites within
their clients' facilities, networks, and the sharing of trade-
marks.40 This Commission also recognized the transition of
many law firms from partnerships to limited liability corpora-
tions and public corporations. 41
While noting past changes in the legal profession, the
Commission's view of the legal profession of the future is in
significant ways radical, precisely because it is so very conser-
vative. Although it breaks important ground by proposing that
the prohibition on lawyers sharing equity with a nonlawyer be
abandoned, the change is not to be achieved by articulating
even a single new substantive ethical principle for the profes-
sion. Rather, the proposed change is to be achieved through
evolution of the corporate and financial structures through
which legal services are delivered. The multidisciplinary prac-
tice would emerge alongside the law firm, the in-house counsel,
and the government office.
Thus, a multidisciplinary practice would be a structure
through which lawyers-still subject to all, save one,42 of the
40. The Commission has issued an Updated Background and Informa-
tional Report and Request for Comments. See COMMISSION ON
MuLTIDIscIPLINARY PRACTICE, AhimERICAN BAR ASSN, UPDATED BACKGROUND
AND INFORMATION REPORT AND REQUEST FOR COMMENTS (1999), available at
<http'/www.abanet.org/cpr/febmdp.html>.
41. In New South Wales (NSW), legislation has been introduced that
would allow law firms to incorporate, raise capital through passive investment
by listing shares on the Australian Stock Exchange and share profits with
other professionals. Proposed by NSW Attorney General Jeff Shaw and ap-
proved by the NSW Cabinet, the legislation might lead to conflict between the
State Government and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission
(ASIC) over a possible provision to ensure that legal professional privilege
overrides the ASIC's powers to obtain access to company files. See Shaw
Should Watch the Society He Keeps, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Sept. 3, 1999, at 27,
available at 1999 WL 26582433.
42. The rule prohibiting lawyers from sharing fees with anyone other than
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rules of the jurisdiction presently governing lawyer conduct-
would be permitted to have nonlawyer professionals as
partners. It might exist in either a regular or a nonregular
form-which is to say, supervised by a lawyer or by a
nonlawyer, respectively-but its primary characteristic would
be easily identified. For the first time in the modern history of
the legal profession, the MDP would allow clients to use
lawyers who deliver legal services as part of a fully integrated
professional practice.43  In its regular form, the MDP's
penultimate decision-maker would have to be a lawyer licensed
to practice within the jurisdiction; in its nonregular form, the
decision-maker could be a professional who is not a lawyer."
While supporting this significant change in the legal pro-
fession, the Commission also recommended significant con-
straints on establishing MDPs. First, as a philosophical mat-
ter, it made clear that the costs of figuratively gaining
possession to the keys of an MDP office would be high. In order
to be certified as an MDP or to continue that certification,
someone who is answerable to the legal profession through, for
example, the jurisdiction's Bar disciplinary process would have
to establish a demonstrated commitment to the lawyer stan-
dards of professional conduct.
For regular MDPs, demonstration of that commitment
would include the years of law school education, bar admissions
testing (including, in most jurisdictions, passage of the Multi-
state Professional Responsibility Exam), and the oath-taking
that are requisite to every attorney's admission to the practice
of law. In other words, the Commission was willing to accept
that lawyer-led regular MDPs were already practiced in exer-
cising precisely the standards that were most critical to the
safeguarding of the rights of clients and the profession in mul-
certain lawyers, would not be applicable to a multidisciplinary practice. See
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (1983).
43. See Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplin-
ary Practice: Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications for
the Core Values Debate, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1115, 1137 (2000) (noting that the
formal prohibition forbidding lawyers from sharing fees with nonlawyers was
not focused on preventing lawyers from bringing peers into their firms, but
aimed, instead, to prevent corporations from practicing law).
44. The terms "regular" and "nonregular" are my own, as is the use of the
phrase 'penultimate decision-maker." The latter definition concedes that the
referenced decision-maker might cede or delegate to a lawyer without reserva-
tion the power to make all law-related decisions for the MDP. Under such cir-
cumstances, what began as a nonregular MDP should be regulated as a regu-
lar MDP.
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tidisciplinary contexts. Lawyer duties arising from the fiducial
nature of the lawyer-client relationship already require that
lawyers protect client confidences and secrets,4 5 avoid conflicts
of interest, and assist in extending representation to those who
need it.
For nonregular MDPs, though, the requisite demonstrated
commitment to the lawyer standards of professional conduct
would be established in a different way. With respect to them,
the Commission followed President Ronald Reagan's memora-
ble admonition regarding the signing of the Intermediate
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (IMF): "Trust but verify."46
MDPs headed by nonlawyers would be allowed, but only subject
to verification of their lawyers' demonstrated commitment to
the standards of the profession.47 The verification would con-
sist, at minimum, of two parts: a self-study report certifying to
the highest court with the authority to regulate the legal pro-
fession answers to questions covering any essential aspect of
the MDP structure and operation deemed relevant;48 and an
audit sufficient for the regulatory body to assure itself of the
MDP's operation in accordance with applicable standards, safe-
guards, and policies. 49 Moreover, the costs of the certification
and audit would be entirely borne by the MDP.50
45. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983) (pro-
viding that a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to client representa-
tion unless exceptions apply); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1980) (providing that a lawyer shall not knowingly
reveal a confidence or secret of his client unless exceptions apply).
46. See William Safire, Nyet Problemy on Snow Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3,
1988, § 6, at 6 (recording Reagan as having said to President Mikhail Gor-
bachev: "Though my pronunciation may give you difficulty, the maxim is
doveryai no proveryai. 'Trust but verify.'").
47. Note that although the Commission contemplates the regulation of
lawyers in the first instance, it does not rule out extending the verification
process as widely as necessary. Thus, the certifying lawyer (or lawyers) in the
MDP would be in a parallel role to that of lawyers who work with nonlawyers
in traditional practice structures.
48. "The Commission decided that these core values were best protected
by recommending a special set of regulatory undertakings to govern the MDP
and the conduct of lawyers in MDPs." REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 28.
49. The Commission noted:
The Recommendation calls for an annual review of the undertakings
and related procedures and to amend the procedures as needed. It re-
quires the MDP to provide a copy of its certificate of compliance to the
lawyers in the MDP and to the highest court with the authority to
regulate the legal profession in each jurisdiction in which the MDP is
engaged in the delivery of legal services. The certification requirement
thus provides a timely reminder to lawyers of their own ethical obliga-
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The essentially conservative outline of what might at first
appear a radical proposal thus becomes apparent. For every
check there is a balance; for every right there is a responsibil-
ity; for every new expense there is a new payer. By establish-
ing an MDP, lawyers may join in equity relationships with
other professionals, but the duty to ensure that professional
standards of ethics are adhered to remains.51 The basic scheme
is straightforward: Lawyer-run MDPs must adhere to the core
values of the legal profession because lawyers are legally bound
to do so; nonlawyer-run MDPs must adhere to the core values
of the legal profession because, as a condition of their authori-
zation, they are contractually bound to do so.
Despite its straightforward scheme for regulation of MDPs
as a whole, the Commission's recommendation is needlessly
ambiguous about its regulation of nonregular MDPs. It does
not rule out the possibility of requiring direct certification of
lawyers practicing within MDPs52 or MDP-like environments, 53
but neither does it affirmatively call for such certification. The
stronger course would seem to be to require certifications
broadly. Every lawyer within a nonregular MDP and every
lawyer who is a subordinate of the person who controls that
tions. Even more significantly, it expands the "regulatory tent" by
making clear that lawyers in MDPs who deliver legal services to cli-
ents are subject to the same regulatory scheme as lawyers in other
practice settings.
Id. (citations omitted).
50. See id.
51. The Commission stated:
To emphasize the importance of the certification being submitted to
the courts, the Commission proposes that it be signed by the chief ex-
ecutive officer (or similar official) and by the board of directors (or
similar body). Furthermore, it has specifically recommended that an
MDP that fails to comply with its written undertaking be subject to
withdrawal of the court's permission to deliver legal services or to
other appropriate remedial measures.
Id. (citations omitted). But see id. at n.67 ("In all likelihood, the lawyers in the
MDP would be subject to discipline as well. Depending upon the circum-
stances of the noncompliance, a client might be able to bring an action for
malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty based on the underlying facts.").
52. Certifications are specifically called for from the chief executive
officers, board of directors, or similar officials. See COMMISSION ON
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, RECOMMENDATION
Recommendation 14 (1999), available at <http'//wwww.abanet.org/cpr/
mdprecommendation.html> [hereinafter RECOMMENDATION].
53. A regulating court is not limited to requiring certifications by lawyers
actually practicing in MDPs. As the regulatory authority, for example, it may
require certifications about working conditions and client safeguards from any
attorney who answers to a nonlawyer superior.
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MDP should be required to sign off on the self-study and certi-
fication. Such a rule would make clear that although lawyers
may join in equity relationships with other professionals
through MDPs, the duty to assure that professional standards
of ethics are adhered to remains that of lawyers. Clients may
have the advantage of the synergies and efficiencies produced
from associating multiple professional services, but if law is one
of those services, then the duty to assure applicable standards
of legal ethics should remain the lawyers' responsibility.
In sum, although the emergence of MDPs should be an es-
sentially seamless evolution for lawyer-led (regular) MDPs,
nonregular MDPs should, by definition, expect more transpar-
ency in their operations, more intrusion into their workspace,
and equal accountability for their conduct.
II. ARE THE KEY CRITIQUES OF THE COMMISSION
REPORT PERSUASIVE?
Notwithstanding the balanced solution proposed by the
Commission, opposition to MDPs has been immediate, pro-
longed, and in many instances extreme. Essentially, though,
the critiques have raised three concerns-about protecting the
majesty of the profession, about the malevolence of the market-
place, and about the likely faint-heartedness of judicial over-
sight. Accordingly, I will critique each of them.
A. THE MYTmC PROFESSION
Concern about the supposed need to protect the majesty of
the legal profession characterized much of the first wave of re-
actions to the Report.54 Because these criticisms were largely
reflexive, having more to do with how critics viewed the legal
profession than the merits of the Report, it is not surprising
that few have been willing to make the argument their primary
basis for opposition. For those who have remained committed
to the argument, however, the highpoint came with Mr. Fox's
speech on the motion to table the Report at the 1999 ABA An-
nual Meeting.55
Rising to the occasion, Mr. Fox recounted in almost mysti-
cal terms how he had recently dreamed about a world that was
54. See generally Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (visited Apr.
26, 2000) <http'//www.abanet.org/cpr/multicom.html> (listing various links to
comments, testimony, and reports on MDPs).
55. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
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so horrifying in its portent that he had been left shaken and
afraid for the future of the legal profession. Jeremiah-like, he
had seen a future wrought with such danger for the legal pro-
fession that the only salvation lay in utter rejection of even the
willingness to consider the subject of a multidisciplinary prac-
tice.56
What was the great evil that portended a plague on the
profession? It was the very idea that the practice of law might
be thought of as a "professional service" that could be rendered
through an ownership structure involving principals who were
not lawyers. As his dream dissolved into nightmare, Mr. Fox
reported that he was horrified to discover that by the year
2050, or so, law firms no longer existed. In their place, there
had arisen--Scary! Scary!-MDPs, where law was practiced
under such names as PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, and
Ernst & Young. It was a world in which those who were once
known as lawyers now kowtowed to accountants in the servile
role as clerks. The accountant principals, moreover, were with-
out principles. In effect, went the nightmare, the now domi-
nant accountants treated clients like commodities, traded client
secrets like Pok6mon trading cards, and embraced the ideal of
legal services for the public good with a variation: What's good
for Ernest & Young, is good for the public.57
Of course, the argument that the majesty of the legal pro-
fession is put at risk by the idea of a multidisciplinary legal
practice depends primarily on acceptance of the premise that
the practice of law is a mythically pure experience. 58 Thus, as a
56. You could almost hear the Prophet, himself: "For my people have
committed two evils; they have forsaken me the fountain of living waters, and
hewed them out cisterns, broken cisterns, that can hold no water." Jeremiah
2:13 (King James).
57. President Eisenhower's Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson, offered
the reductionist business philosophy now regularly invoked to besmirch all
business with his proclamation that: "What's good for General Motors is good
for America." The quote is actually a misquote. Testifying at his confirmation
hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1953, Wilson actually
rejected a question about a potential conflict of interest between his then-
company and the U.S. by noting: "'I cannot conceive of one because for years I
thought that what was good for the country was good for General Motors, and
vice versa.'" A. Samuel Oddi, An Uneasier Case for Copyright Than for Patent
Protection of Computer Programs, 72 NEB. L. REV. 351, 439 n.357 (1993); see
also Robert F. Housman, Democratizing International Trade Decision-Making,
27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 699, 707-08 (1994); Martin H. Redish & Howard M.
Wasserman, What's Good for General Motors: Corporate Speech and the The-
ory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 235 (1998).
58. Note the summary of remarks by Patricia J. Kerrigan, an attorney in
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historical matter, the notion of a golden era 59 when all was
idyllic with the legal profession must conveniently ignore key
facts like the following: that what we today view as the modern
practice of law did not begin to emerge until the 1950s; that
since its earliest days, lawyers have regularly practiced across
disciplines;60 that the prohibition against lawyers sharing fees
private practice in Houston, Texas, who testified on behalf of the Texas Asso-
ciation of Defense Counsel (TADC). See Hearings Before the Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice (Aug. 8, 1999) (testimony of Patricia J. Kerrigan,
President of TADC), available at <http-//www.abanet.org/cpr/kerrigan.html>
[hereinafter Kerrigan Testimony]. "The TADC is a professional organization
comprised of about 2,300 civil trial lawyers whose practice is primarily in ar-
eas other than the representation of plaintiffs and personal injury lawsuits.
Their lawyers engage in the civil practice areas of intellectual property, em-
ployment, insurance, and general civil and tort litigation." Id. In general, the
TADC opposes the recommendations pertaining to MDPs and amending the
ethics rules on several grounds:
First, the proposal is not supported by sufficient study. Second, the
recommendations are fundamentally inconsistent with the preserva-
tion of the core professional and ethical values that are so important
to the legal profession. Third, the proposal raises important ques-
tions on how an MDP may create situations that encourage the unau-
thorized practice of law.
Id.
59. Precise dates-or even a precise nomenclature for the Golden Age,
Golden Era, or Gilded Age, as the preference may be-is difficult to designate.
Michael Ariens has stated that:
A number of biographies exist of elite lawyers whose practices encom-
passed much of the Gilded Age. These works, written between 1917
and 1940 and almost exclusively concerned with the practice of law in
New York City, unanimously agreed that the "great" lawyers before
the turn of the century were advocates, or in today's parlance, trial
lawyers.
Michael Ariens, Know the Law: A History of Legal Specialization, 45 S.C. L.
REV. 1003, 1014 (1994). Others add that the "golden age"--that era when
lawyers "aspired to be governed by a consensus among partners engaged in
law practice, rather than by professional managers who devoted themselves
solely to administrative matters"--lasted approximately through the late
1950s and early 1960s, when law firm partnerships where last exclusive. Mil-
ton C. Regan, Jr., Law Firms, Competition Penalties, and the Values of Profes-
sionalism, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 29 (1999); see also Marc Galanter,
Lawyers in the Mist: The Golden Age of Legal Nostalgia, 100 DICK. L. REV.
549, 558 (1996) ("Whether lawyers' conduct has worsened remains unknown,
but what surely has declined is the opportunity for lawyers to hide beneath
the wraps of confidentiality, free of any external scrutiny.").
60. James W. Jones, Vice Chairman and General Counsel of APCO Asso-
ciates Inc., a global public affairs and strategic communications firm head-
quartered in Washington, D.C., contrasted the ancillary business discussion of
the 1990s with what he characterized as "the flip side" of the debate presented
by the MDP discussion. While the earlier debate had focused on the extent to
which lawyers should be permitted to control entities engaged in multidisci-
plinary practices, the new debate simply acknowledged that "affiliations be-
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with nonlawyers was not formally adopted as part of the pro-
fession's ethic until the 1930s;61 that with respect to both the
in-house counsel situation and the government law office, the
legal profession has long recognized that the risk to lawyer in-
dependence does not arise from the structure of the practice,
but from situations where "[a] non-lawyer has the right to di-
rect or control the professional judgment of a lawyer."62 To re-
ject change, therefore on the basis of the "golden age" myth re-
quires ignoring that for more than thirty years, law firms
operating pursuant to business principles have managed to
maintain the highest degree of ethical and professional com-
mitment.6 3
Looking beyond the historical inaccuracies of the myth,
however, the picture it supposes for the legal profession fails on
another, more important, account. It requires a calculatingly
chauvinistic view of other professions aided by a conveniently
impotent judicial branch that is either unable or unwilling to
police lawyer conduct. Proponents of the myth suggest that to-
day's legal profession is so professionally unique that it, and it
alone, is governed by enforceable ethical standards or notions of
professionalism.64 Thus, we can assume that regardless of ap-
tween lawyers and nonlawyers do not constitute a new phenomenon in Ameri-
can law. Indeed, such affiliations have been a part of the legal landscape in
America for a very long time." In particular, Jones pointed out that "many
practicing lawyers have qualified to practice other professions . . .and hold
separate licenses as certified public accountants, real estate brokers, insur-
ance agents, financial planners, marriage counselors and the like." Hearings
Before the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb. 6, 1999) (written
remarks of James W. Jones, Vice Chairman and General Counsel of APCO As-
sociates Inc.), available at <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/jonesl.html>.
61. See CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 34 (1937).
62. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-107(C)(3)
(1980) (emphasis added).
63. See Bates v. Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977) ("We recognize, of
course, and commend the spirit of public service with which the profession of
law is practiced and to which it is dedicated.")
64. Pat Kerrigan, TADC, provided a typical critique merging the mythic
mystique and malevolent marketplace arguments:
They are extremely concerned by the pressures placed on the lawyer
and the dilemmas created when nonlawyers in corporations attempt
to control the practice of law. They have looked closely at the experi-
ence of patients and doctors when medical care is delivered in a cor-
porate setting and controlled by non-physicians who are not re-
strained or even inspired by the ethical obligations which apply to the
medical profession. A proposal endorsing MDPs ignores the lessons
that have been learned by the medical profession's experience with
HMOs and invites similar consequences to the practice of law. Only a
lawyer owes to the client the ethical professional obligations con-
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plicable standards, nonlawyers working in consort with lawyers
will ignore conflict-of-interest concerns, violate confidences, and
reject the notion of public service.65 As appealing as such an
argument might sound, there is simply no evidence that the
precisely opposite result will not obtain. It seems in fact more
likely that because of the participation of lawyers, who are
usually conceded to be ethically upright, the overall ethics of
firms will be raised.66
B. THE MALEVOLENT MARKETPLACE
It is possible, though, to reject the mythic view of the legal
profession and still conclude that MDPs must fail. Rather than
tained in the canons of legal ethics. Imputation can only apply to a
law firm. To expect an entire MDP to be bound by the conflicts and
ethical rules of the legal profession is unfounded and, quite frankly,
naive, especially when the proposal contains little procedure for en-
forcement or audit of compliance with ethical considerations.
MDPs create a risk unacceptable in today's society that the pro-
fessional and ethical commitment of the lawyer to the client will be
pressured by business considerations and ultimately diminished.
How realistic is it to place a lawyer in a business venture with non-
lawyers where fee-splitting is allowed and the business goals of the
partners are unified, and expect the lawyer to fully adhere to ethics
that may be a complete enigma to his partners and an impediment to
their business goals?
Kerrigan Testimony, supra note 58.
65. A parallel argument is that lawyers are not unique. In this view,
since lawyers are greedy and venal, it cannot be expected that other profes-
sionals will operate differently. Accordingly, multidisciplinary practice should
not be tolerated because that would simply compound the problem. In its most
popular form, however, it is the nonlawyers--especially the accountants-who
are the corrupters. One popular charge is that, "The accountants are already
violating the law every day by practicing law without a license. How could
they be expected to play by the rules that are supposed to govern MDPs?" At
the 25th Annual National Conference on Professional Responsibility, June 3-5,
1999 (LaJolla, California), a panel consisting of Thomas D. Morgan, Professor
of Law at Brigham Young University, Laura L. Chastain, Deputy Chief Disci-
plinary Counsel, Tennessee, M. Peter Moser, Of-counsel to Piper & Marbury,
LLP, Robert E. O'Malley, Senior Loss Prevention Advisor, Attorney's Liability
Assurance Society was told during the question/comment period by Larry Fox
that by allowing lawyers to practice law, while calling such activities, "tax ad-
vising," U.S. accounting firms already daily violate the Model Rules for Profes-
sional Conduct by failing to: avoid conflicts of interest, preserve client confi-
dences, or refrain from receiving value for the referral of business. See PROF.
LAW., Summer 1999, at 19.
66. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (describing the Commis-
sion's proposal of regulating lawyers in addition to corporate officers). See
generally Peter C. Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs: Multidisciplinary
Partnerships in Corporate Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1213 (2000) (ar-
guing that the inclusion of lawyers improves the ethics of the enterprise).
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a critique based on a longing for a non-existent bygone era, dis-
dain for the business elements of the profession and a dismis-
sive attitude towards other professionals, a new, more modern,
concern is raised about the marketplace. It is not that the legal
profession is unsullied and disdainful of those in the pits, but
rather that, as recent entrants to the fray, lawyers are too gen-
teel to survive in the modern marketplace. 67
In this view, the legal profession is too weak and unsophis-
ticated to operate in a rough and tumble marketplace where
the sharp-elbowed interest of international capitalists-mean-
ing here, the Big Five accounting firms-now compete. Rather
than idealism, then, it is the art of the deal that engenders fear
and fuels lawyers' opposition to MDPs. In this new era of glob-
alization, we are told, standards, guarantees, safeguards, moni-
toring and sanctions can never be enough. Nor is confidence to
be placed in personal attitudes, notions of professionalism,
codes of professional ethics, or even the historical record. In
the new era only power in the marketplace counts. And the
new golden rule counts the most: "He who has the gold, makes
the rules."
In the end, though, the strength of the marketplace cri-
tique is that it is irrefutable, precisely because, like the related
mythic profession argument, it focuses on the wrong issue.
Like Mr. Fox's nightmare, it suggests that our course ought to
reflect our answer to the question: Are you so confident that the
doomsday scenario I imagine is not real, that you are willing to
risk what you have?
When Mr. Fox is candid enough to admit, therefore, that it
is "about money," he is telling us something of significance. He
is telling us that, at minimum, opposition to the Report is
based on a sideways glance at how well financially he sees tra-
ditional lawyers fairing in a new environment. The real issue,
though, is not whether lawyers might be skeptical-even fear-
ful-of change and the unknown risks it brings, but rather,
why we should doubt lawyers' abilities to survive and prosper
in any situation, including a judicially regulated MDP envi-
ronment.
67. See Krane Testimony, supra note 20 ("We can seriously question
whether the nonlawyer members of an MDP will stand idly by while the law-
yers in the organization attempt to fulfill their traditional functions of stand-
ing up to the excesses of government, representing unpopular causes, and pro-
viding free legal services to the poor.").
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The bases for such doubts are, of course, as varied as the
number of lawyers, but there are two concerns that are raised
so frequently that they deserve singling out. First, it is argued
that since many professions, such as accounting,68 prohibit (or
at least limit) the interest that lawyers (or other professionals)
can have in their organizations, as a matter of fairness, such
professions should not be allowed to have ownership in our
firms. If the only way to prevent such unilateral disarmament
is to bar equity interest by all professions, then the price is
worth paying.
As if to make the point that opposition to the Report is not
entirely self-motivated, however, opponents argue as a second
matter that law firms are simply financially unable to compete
with competitors such as the accounting firms, because law
firms lack the capital structure that would be necessary to such
an undertaking. The reason MDPs should not be allowed,
therefore, is not because lawyers oppose them as a matter of
economic interest, but because allowing a nonlawyer profes-
sional to own the controlling interest in an equity relationship
that includes lawyers would lead inevitably-no matter what
other limitations or safeguards might exist-to the subordina-
tion of a lawyer's professional obligations to the needs of the
principal owner.
Thus, we are to believe that lawyers are both unwilling
and unable to play in the global marketplace. The concern for
proponents of this view is market nich6; the clients' needs be
damned. If the Federal Trade Commission will acquiesce in the
barriers to entry created to keep lawyers from, say, heading an
accounting firm, then the appropriate response ought to be tit-
for-tat. More diplomatically stated, since no other profession
can reasonably claim that they maintain either standards or
enforcement practices superior to those of the legal profession,
any barriers that exist to lawyer control of another profession
must be economically self-serving. But if that is the case, what
is good for one ought to be good for all.
In the alternative, we are told that even if lawyers are
willing to accept a service-oriented marketplace, where only the
interests of clients-not the economic needs of lawyers-is the
standard, it would be impossible to achieve such a regime. The
economic realities of the marketplace, we are told, preclude it,
68. See AICPA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 505 (visited Apr.
25, 2000) <http'//www.aicpa.org/about/code/et505.htm>.
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(a single international corporation, like Arthur Andersen,
dwarfs the value of the top five law firms combined).69 It seems
more likely, however, that nonlawyer-controlled MDPs would
flourish because they would have the advantages of ready capi-
tal without the disadvantages of a principal who is directly
subject to the lawyers' standards of professional conduct.
C. FAINT-HEARTED MANAGEMENT
Common to the concerns about protecting the majesty of
the profession and marketplace mistrust, however, is a third,
overarching, concern-concern about the willingness or capac-
ity of the lawyer regulatory systems of the several jurisdictions
to regulate lawyers. This concern is expressed, first, as a con-
clusion that lawyer regulatory authorities across the country do
not adequately regulate the practice of law. Indeed, the claim
is more strongly put as a charge that, but for the failure of law-
yer regulatory bodies to protect practitioners from individuals
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, there would have
been no need for a commission to study multijurisdictional
practice. 70 In this view, the heart of the problem is that state
regulatory authorities have failed to prevent accounting firms,
in particular, from engaging in the unauthorized practice of
law. By allowing accounting firms, for example, to hire law-
69. Baker & McKenzie, the largest law firm in the world, in 1992 reported
annual income of $503.4 million. See Rod Riggs, NAFTA Called Step into
World: Top Lawyer Cites Role for San Diego, SAN-DIEGO UNION-TR1B., Oct. 9,
1992, at D1, available in LEXIS, Major Newspapers File. Arthur Andersen
has annual billing worldwide of $5 billion. See George Gombossy, Arthur An-
dersen Sued over Work with Colonial, HARTFORD COuRANT, Apr. 7, 1993, at
Al, available in LEXIS, Major Newspapers File.
70. This concern was most recently given expression in the ABA House of
Delegates' adoption of the Ohio resolution calling upon jurisdictions to enforce
unauthorized practice of law provisions. The implicit assumption that such
laws are capable of enforcement to a degree that would reverse changes that
have occurred in the global marketplace went unexplored. The Daily Journal
ABA House of Delegates Report of Action Taken at the ABA Midyear Meeting
Dallas, Texas February 14, 2000, summarized action taken on an Ohio State
Bar Association resolution that was cosponsored by the Tennessee Bar, North
Carolina Bar Association, the Indiana State Bar Association, the Cuyahoga
County Bar Association, the Maricopa County Bar Association, the Broward
County Bar Association, the State Bar of Michigan, the Wisconsin Bar, and
the Arkansas Bar. Report No. 8B, urged each jurisdiction to establish and im-
plement effective procedures for the discovery and investigation of violations
of its laws prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law and to pursue active
enforcement of such laws.
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yers71 to engage in the giving of so-called "tax and business ad-
vice," the argument is that enfeebled lawyer regulatory bodies
have all but invited accounting firms to engage in the unau-
thorized practice of law.
Despite the insistence by accounting firms that they avoid
the practice of law by limiting their involvement with clients to
such activities as discussions with in-house counsel, advising
clients about non-substantive matters of policy, and directing
clients to secure legal representation, many lawyers remain
unconvinced. For opponents of the Report, even with substan-
tial costs and the risk of loss of face,72 nothing short of the most
zealous prosecution of the unauthorized practice of law would
be sufficient.
Lack of confidence in the ability of the courts to regulate
nonregular MDPs,73 however, has a second dimension. Even
assuming that the courts desire to pursue aggressively unau-
thorized-practice-of-law cases,74 MDP opponents doubt that
courts would have the capacity to do so. -They suggest that it
would take a huge bureaucracy to review the self-audit and cer-
tifications. 75 In addition, undertaking the audits themselves
would be too costly.76
71. The hiring of "lawyers" as used in this instance also includes indi-
viduals who are educated in the law, but who are unlicensed in the jurisdic-
tion.
72. See generally In re Nolo Press/Folk Law, Inc., 991 S.W.2d 768 (Tex.
1999).
73. Note that judicial regulation of regular MDPs is not in dispute, be-
cause under the terms of the Commission proposal, regular MDPs-unlike
nonregular MDPs-would be regulated only in the manner provided for tradi-
tional law firms:
As a condition of permitting a lawyer to engage in the practice of law
in an MDP not controlled by lawyers, the MDP should be required to
give to the highest court with the authority to regulate the legal pro-
fession in each jurisdiction in which the MDP is engaged in the deliv-
ery of legal services (the "court"), a written undertaking, signed by the
chief executive officer (or similar official) and the board of directors
(or similar body)[.]
See RECOMENDATION, supra note 52, Recommendation 14 (concerning inde-
pendent professional judgment; the proper maintenance of client funds; ad-
herence to the lawyer rules of professional conduct; the promotion of lawyers'
pro bono publico obligation; and compliance with and payment for an annual
administrative audit).
74. Unauthorized practice of law cases are commonly referred to as "UPL"
cases.
75. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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Given the breadth of the objections raised to the Report, it
is not surprising that upon reconvening following its submis-
sion to the ABA House of Delegates, Commissioners expressed
strong reservations about their willingness to continue to sup-
port what are here described as the Commission's moderate
recommendations.7 7 Nor is it surprising that not a single
member of the Commission showed the slightest willingness to
undermine the core values of the legal profession. To the con-
trary, the Commission expressed the view that absent a solu-
tion that protected the core values, no further recommenda-
tions were likely to be issued. Whatever the extent to which
Commissioners were willing to acknowledge the legitimacy of
codes of ethics and standards of professionalism with respect to
other professionals, the need to affirm the core values of the le-
gal profession remained. Similarly, concerns about the impact
of the marketplace on the viability of MDPs remained a consid-
eration, although not a determinant.
Thus, the Commission appears at this stage-three months
beforp the ABA Annual Meeting-to be fully cognizant of the
need to avoid a bureaucratic response. The objective remains
that of using MDP participants in cooperation with the existing
judicial regulatory scheme to assure that proposed changes are
practical. It is unclear, however, how the Commission will pro-
pose that objective be met.
III. WHAT IS THE PROPER ROLE OF ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS?
Presently, it is too early to determine what the Commis-
sion will do in response to the wave of criticism following the
release of the Report.78 It is clear, however, what it ought do as
a professional and ethical matter. In a sentence: It should con-
tinue to hold the center. It should not be deterred by those who
claim that the Commission has opened the doors of the profes-
sion too wide by allowing nonlawyers to enter into peer-
professional relationships with lawyers.7 9 Nor should it heed
77. See COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR
ASS'N, POSTSCRIPT (2000), available at <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/postscript.
html> (presenting a post-Dallas summary of issues, concerns, and proposals
under discussion).
78. See, e.g., COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN
BAR ASS'N, DRAFT RECOMMENDATION (Mar. 2000), available at <http'/lwww.
abanet.org/cpr/marchrec.html>.
79. It is an issue of peer relationships that is in dispute; not an issue, as
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the cries of those who complain that the Commission has made
the price for entering into lawyer-peer relationships-self-
study, certification, and audit-too high.
If its work is to have credibility outside the legal profes-
sion, what the Commission must affirm is that even while it
speaks to the legal profession, it speaks for the public interest.
It cannot afford to be seen as engaged in turf-protection or as
acting to safeguard lawyers' economic interest at the expense of
the public interest. Instead, the Commission must be seen as
having been willing to put to itself the same hard questions
that lawyers regularly put to defendants when matters of myth
and lax regulatory oversight threaten to distort the market-
place. Thus, the queries ultimately come down to two: Do the
present rules barring lawyers from entering into equity rela-
tionships with other professionals-i.e., fee sharing-prevent
lawyers from providing clients the very highest quality service?
If the answer is yes, then a second question arises: Do there
exist reasonable alternatives to the present rule that would al-
low lawyers both to practice as competent lawyers and to pro-
vide the very highest quality legal services to clients?
In light of the Commission's Report, we now know that the
answer to both questions is affirmative. But for the prohibition
on the sharing of fees with nonlawyers, the marketplace would
deliver legal services through partnerships providing the high-
est degree of expertise known to exist. Conversely, we know
that because of the prohibition on fee sharing, law firms are
able to hire (and, thus, make available to clients) only a limited
strata of experts from other professional fields. Nonlawyer pro-
fessionals who have the highest level of expertise have not and
will not make themselves continuously available to serve law-
yers (for example, as analysts in law firms), because to do so
would relegate such professionals to a second-tier status within
law firms. Thus, elite-level nonlawyer professionals (as meas-
ured by education, experience, income, and status) are effec-
tively precluded from partnering with lawyers seeking to assist
clients in need of legal services. The barrier to fee sharing as-
the most partisan would have believed, of the subordination of lawyers to
nonlawyers. The Commission does not recommend a situation where lawyers
would be freed from their current obligation under the ABA Model Rules (and
similar standards) to exercise independent judgment. The impossibility ar-
gument provides that lawyers are personally too weak and the regulatory
mechanisms too feeble to reasonably expect lawyers to adhere to principles.
See supra Part II.B. (discussing the malevolent marketplace).
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sures that nonlawyer expertise can never be equally valued
with the expertise of lawyers within a law firm. Lacking such
economic equality, moreover, nonlawyers are also deprived of
its corollary equal status.80
Worse yet is the second market distortion that results from
prohibiting lawyers from entering into equity relationships
with nonlawyers. Because clients are willing to pay to secure
the highest level of expertise the marketplace can produce, pro-
viders of legal services are motivated to operate "under the ta-
ble."81 The phenomenon is well-known of the lawyer who works
in an accounting firm (or some other professional service en-
tity), but who denies that his advising, interpreting, organizing
and strategizing constitutes the practice of law. In order to get
the multidisciplinary assistance they desire, clients must turn
80. Steven C. Krane argues, in effect, that nonlawyer professionals are
adequately compensated under presently permitted trickle-down procedures:
The rules of professional ethics in effect in most jurisdictions in the
United States today permit nonlawyer employees to be compensated
through profit-sharing plans. The services of nonlawyer professionals
can thus be integrated with those of lawyers in a law firm and the
nonlawyers compensated based on the success of the overall venture.
Krane Testimony, supra note 20.
The position begs the question: If this is the way to assure market com-
petitiveness, why are lawyers generally not compensated under such schemes?
81. See Hearings Before the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice
(Aug. 8, 1999) (testimony of Leo Jordon, Past Chair of the Tort and Insurance
Practice Section and a Member of the House of Delegates), available at
<http'//www.abanet.org/cpr/jordon.html>. At the Hearings, Leo Jordon re-
lated the following episode:
He was in a conference rbom with about 10-15 lawyers and hadn't re-
alized that the other law firm had a small public affairs subsidiary,
some members of which were also in the room. As the discussion
went on it became clear that there were nonlawyers in the room and
it had a major negative impact on the discussion. The discussion was
not in any sense complete because the question arose immediately as
to how confidential the discussion was. The concept of what is confi-
dential communication is of extreme importance to the profession.
There are other questions. Would a personal injury law firm be per-
mitted to establish a truly full-service MDP? What, in fact, would be
a full-service personal injury law firm? Would a law firm specializing
in financial planning be permitted to associate with a life insurance
agent to facilitate one stop shopping? Would the profits of the MDP
encompass the commission of the insurance agency and would that
put undue influence on the client? TIPS honestly does not know the
answer to these questions and needs time to reflect on the effect and
long term implications of an MDP. With these thoughts in mind TIPS
will support deferral within the House and hopes additional time will
give them an opportunity to come back and have a more enlightened
response to some very important developments.
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to lawyers who are willing to practice beyond the regulatory
reach of the profession. Instead of recognizing the need and is-
suing a response, until now the legal profession has found it
more salubrious either to ignore the problem of the under-
ground practice of law or to engage in threats and bluster on
the assumption that the providers or users of elite multidisci-
plinary legal services will be cowed or fail to understand that
what they are doing is of obvious and reciprocal benefit. In its
simplest terms, however, the underground delivery of multidis-
ciplinary practice is a case of the marketplace responding to a
consumer need created by an overbroad limitation on services.
Ultimately the Commission, like the legal profession as a
whole, must decide whether the needs of clients or the needs of
individual economic players will determine the thrust of its
regulation. If it is to be the needs of the latter, the reasonable
response is to continue the prohibition on nonlawyers entering
into equity relationships with lawyers. The rule succeeds,
however, in lowering the quality of expertise generally avail-
able to clients.82 It increases profits for lawyers and motivates
lawyers and clients to collude in the delivery of underground
legal services. Furthermore, the status quo reinforces suspi-
cions that lawyers are, more often than not, interested in ad-
vancing their own welfare at the expense of their clients'.
Conversely, if the needs of clients are to guide the scope of
judicial regulation of the legal profession, the reasonable re-
sponse is to end the prohibition on nonlawyers entering into
equity relationships with lawyers by embracing MDPs and the
self-study, certification, and audit requirements that support it.
We must see the prohibition on lawyers sharing fees with non-
lawyers for what it is-a virtual guarantee that the quality of
expertise generally available to clients will be lower than opti-
mum. Only experts who are prepared to allow the legal profes-
sion to be comprised of lawyer-subordinates will countenance it.
By depressing the quality of available experts, the prohibi-
tion exposes both the public and the legal profession to exploi-
tation. In the underground world outside the realm of judicial
regulation, lawyers who promote themselves as providing busi-
ness advice, financial-planning, and the like have little incen-
tive to respect the core values and concerns of the legal profes-
82. Furthermore, by delivering lower quality expertise to the public, law-
yers are able to pocket the difference represented by income that would other-
wise have had to be applied to overhead or shared between the lawyer and a
nonlawyer peer.
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sion. When the cost of maintaining the status quo is to open
the legal profession to the charge that for the sake of money it
is refusing to heed the public's call for the cautious, step-by-
step, cost-free alternative represented by the MDP proposal, it
is clear that a change is overdue.
